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ESSAY
Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust
ROBIN COOPER FELDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
For almost a century, antitrust commentators have struggled to explain
leverage behavior. Why do firms engage in leverage? What are the potential
effects, and how should antitrust law respond? In answering these questions, the
prevailing wisdom has swung around the compass without resting in a satisfac-
tory place. The debate in recent decades has focused on one question: Can a
monopolist use leverage to gain additional monopoly profit from a second
market?
In this piece, I will introduce the theory of defensive leveraging. Defensive
leverage theory suggests that leverage theorists have been asking an incomplete
question. Leverage behavior should not be analyzed solely as an attempt to reap
additional monopoly rent from a second market. Rather, it is frequently an
attempt to prevent erosion of the primary monopoly.
Leverage occurs when a monopolist uses power in one market to induce or
foreclose sales in another market and thereby monopolize both.' For example,
consider two markets: a market for cameras and a market for film. The camera
market is dominated by one firm; many firms compete in the film market.
Suppose the camera monopolist begins selling its cameras only on condition
that the buyer also purchase all film from the monopolist. 2 If the monopolist
takes over enough sales in the film market, it will drive other film competitors
out. The monopolist then has a film monopoly in addition to a camera mo-
nopoly. This is leveraging.
In the first half of the century, courts, commentators, and legislators attacked
leverage behavior as dangerous to competition. Their arguments focused on the
structural changes in the second market. For example, by forcing other film
manufacturers out of the market, the monopolist transforms a competitive
market into a monopolized one. Presumably, the monopolist then can raise
price, limit supply, and reap monopoly profits from the new market. Thus,
according to traditional leverage theory, a monopolist leverages to increase
overall returns by adding monopoly returns from a second market to the
monopoly returns from the first.
* Lecturer in Law, Stanford Law School. I am grateful to Richard Craswell and Herbert Hovenkamp
for their comments and insights.
1. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (describing traditional leverage theory).
2. The original monopolized market is the primary market and the newly linked market is the
secondary market. In the example above, cameras are the primary market, and film is the secondary
market.
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The traditional leverage argument contained the following implicit assump-
tion: Two monopolies create more monopoly profits, and therefore more eco-
nomic damage, than the original monopoly alone. In other words, we know that
a monopoly creates dead weight loss. A second monopoly should increase the
amount of loss. The assumption seemed so intuitively correct that theorists did
not even bother to discuss it. If one monopoly is bad, surely two monopolies are
worse.
The Chicago school blasted the assumptions implicit in the traditional analy-
sis of leverage behavior.3 Chicago scholars agreed that leveraging transforms
the secondary market from a competitive one into a monopoly. They argued,
however, that one must look at pricing in the primary and secondary markets
combined to analyze the impact of leveraging.
The Chicago school showed that a monopolist cannot raise prices in the
secondary market without losing profits in the primary market. A monopolist
can gain all of its monopoly profit from one market or all of its profit from the
other, but it cannot increase the total amount of monopoly profit available. Thus,
even if a monopolist gains control of a second market through leverage, the
monopolist will not be able to reap additional monopoly profit. Leveraging,
therefore, does not create more economic damage than the original monopoly
alone. In addition, given that leveraging cannot increase the amount of mo-
nopoly profit available, the Chicago school concluded that a monopolist usually
engages in leveraging for pro-competitive or neutral reasons.4
Defensive leveraging theory, as introduced below, offers a different view of
leverage behavior. According to the theory, leverage behavior frequently can be
understood, not as an attempt to reap additional monopoly profit from a second
market, but as an attempt to prevent erosion of the primary monopoly. The
camera monopolist, for example, is not trying to gain additional monopoly
profits by leveraging into film. It is trying to prevent the natural erosion of its
camera monopoly. A complex analysis of the lifecycle of a monopoly shows
that defensive leveraging is a natural and effective weapon for preserving the
primary monopoly.
Part I of this piece summarizes traditional leverage, Chicago school, and
post-Chicago theories. Part II explains defensive leveraging and applies the
theory to three market examples: Microsoft's behavior in the market for Internet
browsers, competition between physicians and nonphysicians, and Eli Lilly's
behavior in the market for cephalosporins. Part III discusses the implications for
antitrust law that arise from defensive leveraging theory.
3. See infra notes 26-37 and accompanying text (describing Chicago school theories).
4. In the past decade, post-Chicago scholars have chipped away at the Chicago school theories in a
variety of areas of antitrust. The post-Chicago school uses game theory to show how small and
medium-sized firms in certain circumstances can use market imperfections to harm rivals. Post-Chicago
theories, however, require intricate fact finding and do not lead to broad generalizations. As a result,
courts have been slow to embrace post-Chicago theories. See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text
(describing post-Chicago theories).
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An analogy from the predatory pricing arena can be applied to defensive
leveraging. Analysts have long debated whether predatory pricing is a white
tiger or a unicorn. A white tiger is an exceedingly rare animal; a unicorn is
completely mythical.6 Thus, if a behavior is like a white tiger, it is dangerous
but rarely seen. If a behavior is like a unicorn, it is completely mythical and
cannot exist.
To borrow the analogy, the Chicago school asserts that leverage behavior that
damages competition is a unicorn. It is completely mythical because a monopo-
list cannot reap additional monopoly profit from a second market.
Post-Chicago scholars have identified damaging leverage behavior in a few
particularized circumstances. Their analysis suggests that the Chicago school's
mythical beast is at least a white tiger. It exists, even if only in rare circum-
stances.
Defensive leveraging theory shows that the Chicago school is wrong because
it fails to consider changes in the structure of the primary market. When these
changes are considered, leveraging that damages competition is neither a
white tiger nor a unicorn. It is just a plain old work horse in a monopolist's
field.
I. THE LEVERAGE DEBATE
Leverage occurs when a monopolist uses power in one market to induce or
foreclose sales in another market and thereby monopolize both.7 It is most
frequently discussed in analyzing tying cases. Tying occurs when a firm agrees
to sell a product only on condition that the buyer either purchase a different
product as well or agree not to purchase the second product from another
supplier.8 The classic tying case is International Salt Co. v. United States,9 in
which a firm produced machines that injected salt tablets into canned goods.l°
The firm leased the machines on condition that the lessee use only the firm's
salt tablets. The Supreme Court condemned the practice under § 3 of the
5. See Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 835, 873 n.277 (1997).
6. See id.
7. See Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953) (describing "monopo-
listic leverage" as when a seller exploits its dominant position in one market to expand its empire into
the next); 9 PHILIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1700d, at 6-7 (1991) (explaining leverage and
describing how a sole manufacturer of can-filling machinery leverages the machine monopoly into a
can monopoly as well); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV.
837 (1990) (describing leverage as when a firm with monopoly power in one market can use leverage
provided by this power to foreclose sales in, and thereby monopolize, a second market); see also
Lawrence A. Sullivan & Ann I. Jones, Monopoly Conduct, Especially Leveraging Power from One
Product or Market to Another, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 165, 171 (1992)
(showing how a firm with power in one market exploits that power in another).
8. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). The film and camera
hypothetical above is an example of tying.
9. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
10. See id. at 394.
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Clayton Act1' and § 1 of the Sherman Act, 12 expressing concern over a creeping
tendency toward monopolization in the salt market.'
3
Although leverage theory is best known in the context of tying cases, antitrust
authorities also have applied leverage theory in cases involving vertical merg-
ers, exclusive dealing, reciprocal dealing, and monopolization under § 2 of the
Sherman Act. 14 For example, United States v. Griffith15 provides a classic case
of leverage theory applied in the context of both Sherman Act § 1 (tying) and
§ 2 (monopolization). 16 Griffith owned a large number of movie theaters.
Roughly two-thirds of the theaters were located in towns with no other theaters.
One-third were located in towns in which Griffith faced competition from other
theaters. 7 Griffith bargained with movie distributors for first-run rights for the
chain as a whole. Thus, distributors who wanted to show their pictures in the
one-theater towns had to agree to give Griffith first-run rights in the competitive
towns as well.18 The Supreme Court held that Griffith's behavior violated § 2 of
the Sherman Act, which forbids monopolization, as well as § 1 of the Sherman
Act, which has been interpreted to condemn tying.' 9 Thus, the Court applied
leverage theory to a monopolization claim as well as a tying claim.
In short, leverage occurs when a monopolist uses power in one market to
induce or foreclose sales in another market and thereby monopolize both. It has
been identified in cases brought under a variety of antitrust doctrines.
A. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF LEVERAGE
Both Congress and the courts have objected to firms using monopoly power
in one market to expand into other markets and thereby create additional
monopolies. In an early tying case, the Supreme Court commented that "[t]ying
arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competi-
tion."' 20 Congress has expressed similar views. The House Report on § 3 of the
Clayton Act condemned tying contracts, calling them "one of the greatest
agencies and instrumentalities of monopoly ever devised by the brain of man." 2'
11. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
13. See International Salt, 332 U.S. at 396; 10 PiLp E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 1733d, at
21(1996).
14. See Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 515,
515, 517 (1985). A vertical merger is a merger between firms at different levels in the production chain,
such as manufactures and distributors. See id. at 515 n.1. Reciprocal dealing occurs when one firm
agrees to purchase from another firm on condition that the other firm also agree to purchase from the
original firm. For example, a steel company could agree to buy trucks from a truck manufacturer on
condition that the truck manufacturer agree to buy steel in return. See id. Exclusive dealing occurs
when a seller agrees to sell only to one customer or a buyer agrees to buy only from one firm.
15. 334 U.S. 100, 109 (1947).
16. See id. at 109.
17. See id. at 101.
18. See Sullivan & Jones, supra note 7, at 172 (describing Griffith).
19. See Griffith, 334 U.S. at 109.
20. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
21. Report of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. RaP. No. 63-627, pt. 1, at 13 (1914),
2082 [Vol. 87:2079
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Traditional concern about leveraging focuses on structural changes in the
secondary market. For example, consider the camera and film hypothetical
described above. Before leveraging, a number of firms compete in the film
market. Once the camera monopolist sells its cameras only on condition that the
buyer also purchase all film from the monopolist, the monopolist drives other
film competitors out of the market.22 The monopolist thereby changes the
competitive film market into a monopolized market. The structural change
occurs, not because the monopolist offers a better product or a lower price but
because of its power in another market.23
The change in the film market distorts consumers' choices by forcing them to
buy products they would not buy in a competitive market.24 In addition,
leveraging may make it more difficult for new firms to enter the film market
because new entrants must be prepared to enter the camera market as well. 25
Most important, according to traditional leverage theorists, once the monopolist
eliminates competition in the film market, the monopolist can raise price, limit
supply, and reap monopoly profits from the film market. Consumers then face
monopoly pricing in both the camera market and the film market.
Traditional theorists assumed that the monopolist would be able to generate
monopoly profits from the secondary market and add them to the monopoly
profits generated in the primary market. The assumption has such intuitive
appeal that theorists did not discuss it. Surely, two monopolies generate more
monopoly returns than one.
If a monopolist could reap monopoly profits from both markets, the two
monopolies together would create more economic damage than the original
monopoly alone. In other words, we know that monopoly pricing in one market
creates a dead weight loss for society. Monopoly pricing in two markets,
therefore, would create an even greater loss. Thus, if the assumptions of
traditional leverage theory were accurate, leveraging into a second monopoly
would create a greater dead weight loss than the loss from the original mo-
nopoly alone.
In sum, according to traditional leverage theory, a monopolist leverages to
increase overall returns by adding monopoly returns from a second market to
the monopoly returns from the first. This increase in monopoly returns damages
reprinted in 2 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUrES, pt.
I, at 1094 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978); see also 9 AREEDA, supra note 7, 1700d, at 6 (noting that the
House Report forcefully expressed fear of the power to leverage into a second market).
22. This assumes that the monopolist can control enough of the sales in the film market to eliminate
competition.
23. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
24. See, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. United States, 394 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1969) (White, J., dissenting on
other grounds).
25. Commentators disagree, however, about whether the need to enter two markets deters entry. See
Kaplow, supra note 14, at 537-39 (describing both sides of the debate and arguing that integration does
raise barriers).
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competition and creates a greater dead weight loss for society than a single
monopoly.
B. THE CHICAGO RESPONSE
Traditional leverage theory lost ground with the emergence of the Chicago
school of antitrust and its focus on price theory to analyze behavior.
26 Chicago
school scholars sharply criticized leverage theory. They acknowledged that
leveraging changes the secondary market from a competitive one to a mo-
nopoly. 27 They argued, however, that the interaction of pricing in the two
markets prevents the monopolist from charging monopoly prices in both. By
definition, the two products are used together. Thus, increasing the price of one
will restrict the monopolist's ability to raise the price of the other. As a result,
the monopolist can gain all of its monopoly profit in one market, or all of its
monopoly profit in the other, but it cannot increase the total amount of mo-
nopoly profit available. A second monopoly obtained through leverage, there-
fore, generates no more monopoly profits than the original monopoly alone.
Following the teachings of Professor Aaron Director,28 the Chicago school
offered a simple proof to show that leverage cannot generate additional mo-
nopoly profits. For example, assume that the marginal cost to produce a roll of
film is $1. In a perfectly competitive market, consumers would pay $1 for each
roll of film.29 Assume further that a photographer is willing to pay $10 for the
costs involved in shooting each roll of film. The $10 must include both the film
cost and the cost of using the camera. If a firm is in the camera market only and
has a monopoly, it can extract a maximum of $9 of "camera cost" for each roll
of film the photographer shoots. In other words, if the photographer is willing to
pay a maximum of $10 for camera and film, and film costs $1, the camera can
cost up to $9.
The simplest approach for the camera monopolist would be to rent out the
camera for $9 per each roll of film shot and allow the photographer to buy film
for $1 a roll on the open market. The photographer would pay a total of $10 per
roll of pictures, the maximum he is willing to pay.
Alternatively, the camera monopolist can leverage into the film market and
raise the price of film. Assume, for example, that the monopolist raises the price
of film to $8 a roll. The photographer, however, is only willing to pay a total of
$10 in cost for the camera plus the film. If the monopolist charges $8 for film, it
26. See generally Michael S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1, 36-37
(1994) ("Chicagoans contended specifically that price theory explained diverse markets better than
industry case studies that, although rich in factual detail, were poorly founded in economic theory.").
27. See, e.g., Whinston, supra note 7, at 837 (conceding that tying can lead to a monopolization of
the tied good market).
28. See Kaplow, supra note 14, at 518 n.12; Whinston, supra note 7, at 837.
29. In a perfectly competitive market, which is a rare beast, firms will price at marginal cost. 3A
PmLtP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 761, at 54 (1996). See generally PAUL A.
SAMUELSON & WILIAM D. NoRDHANs, EcONoMIcs 475-79 (12th ed. 1985) (describing price and supply
behavior in a perfectly competitive market).
[Vol. 87:20792084
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must reduce the price of renting out the camera to $2 (the $10 maximum total
cost the photographer will pay less the $8 cost of the film). By raising the price
of film from $1 a roll to $8 a roll, the monopolist gains $7 a roll in increased
film profits. The monopolist loses $7 a roll, however, in camera rental charges
(the original $9 rental price less the new $2 rental price). The $7 loss cancels
out the $7 gain. Thus, the monopolist has gained nothing from raising film
prices above the competitive rate.3°
The "one monopoly profit theory" has been widely accepted among academ-
ics. 3 1 In the words of a leading Chicago theorist, the traditional leverage
assumptions have been discredited and, in the tying context, "thoroughly and
repeatedly demolished in the legal and economic literature." 32 According to the
Chicago analysis, a monopolist simply cannot reap additional monopoly profits
by leveraging into a second market.
If the monopolist cannot earn additional monopoly profit, why do monopo-
lists engage in leveraging? The Chicago school offers a handful of possible
motives.33 Some of the explanations involve removing impediments to full
exploitation of the original monopoly. For example, Chicago theorists suggest
that a monopolist may use leverage to engage in price discrimination. This
would allow the monopolist, in effect, to charge different prices to different
users in an effort to extract the maximum profit from each.3 4 Without price
discrimination, a monopolist might be unable to extract the full amount of
monopoly profit available in the primary market. Price discrimination would
yield the full amount of monopoly profit. It would not, however, allow the
monopolist to expand its profit beyond that which would be available from full
exploitation of the original monopoly.
Not all of the Chicago explanations are socially desirable. For example,
30. See RICHARD A. PosNER, ANTITIUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 173 (1976) (detailing a
similar hypothetical); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WTH
ITSELF 140 (1978) (describing traditional leverage theory as "the fallacy of double counting"); Aaron
Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 281 (1956);
Whinston, supra note 7, at 837 (discussing a variation of the proof applied to products that are not
complements).
31. See, e.g., M. Sean Royall, Editors'Note to Symposium: Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST
L.J. 445, 450 (1995).
32. BORK, supra note 30, at 372. One antitrust textbook, for example, provides the following
discussion of traditional leverage theory: "According to this view, somehow the seller expands or
levers his monopoly power from one market to another. This, of course, is not possible. A seller cannot
get two monopoly profits from one monopoly." Whinston, supra note 7, at 838 n.3 (citing ROGER D.
BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983)).
Similarly, the Hovenkamp antitrust hornbook notes that leveraging is not a plausible way to increase
monopoly profits. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 370 (1994). Hovenkamp notes further that the "theory that a monopoly seller can use
a tie-in to enlarge monopoly profits has been condemned repeatedly by commentators for four
decades." Id.
33. See, e.g., Whinston, supra note 7, at 837 (listing price discrimination, achieving economies of
scale, protection of goodwill, risk sharing, and cheating on a cartel price as possible motives).
34. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19,
23-24 (1957).
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Professor Bowman describes how a monopolist can use leverage to evade
government price regulations.35 None of the explanations, however, would
increase the amount of monopoly profit a monopolist could gain if it were able
to engage in full exploitation of the original monopoly. Thus, despite distortions
of the secondary market, leverage behavior would not increase society's overall
losses.
3 6
Why does a monopolist engage in leveraging? According to the Chicago
school, it cannot be for the purpose of expanding monopoly profits beyond
those available in the primary market. Thus, it must be for pro-competitive or
neutral reasons.37
C. POST-CHICAGO THEORIES
In the last decade, post-Chicago scholars have challenged the broad generaliza-
tions of the Chicago school. 38 Using game theory, post-Chicago theorists show
how small and medium-sized firms can take advantage of market imperfections
to harm rivals.39 In the classic article Raising Rivals' Costs, Professors Kratten-
maker and Salop argue that in carefully defined circumstances, certain firms can
attain monopoly power by using strategic behavior to place their competitors at
a disadvantage.4°
Post-Chicago theories require intricate fact finding and do not lead to broad
generalizations. 4' In the leverage area, for example, Ordover describes special
circumstances in which a monopolist can use tying to obtain additional mo-
nopoly profit when the monopolist is blocked from fully exploiting the original
monopoly by rivals that produce inferior substitutes.42
35. See id. at 21-23.
36. Although traditional leverage theory has been fully discredited in the academic literature,
Congress has not responded. The persistence may reflect nagging doubts about the Chicago school's
interpretation of leverage. Despite the simplicity and appeal of the Chicago analysis, legislators may be
unable to shake the intuition that expanding to create additional monopolies is harmful.
37. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES (1985), reprinted
in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103, at 20,564 (1985) ("Tying arrangements often serve procompeti-
tive or competitively neutral purposes... [They] generally do not have a significant anticompetitive
potential."); Whinston, supra note 7, at 838 (describing such tying explanations as "socially beneficial
or at worst ambiguous"). The 1985 VERTICAL RESTRArNTS GUIDELINES were repealed in 1993. Michael
H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTrrRUST
L.J. 513, 514 (1995).
38. See Jacobs, supra note 26, at 36 n.151 (describing the leading post-Chicago articles).
39. See id. at 34.
40. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 214 (1986).
41. See Post Chicago Analysis After Kodak: Interview with Professor Steven C. Salop, 7 ANTITRUST
20 (Fall/Winter 1992) [hereinafter Salop Interview]; Royall, supra note 31, at 446 ("post-Chicagoans
tend to use economic theory to highlight uncertainties and thus to justify keeping the doors open to
further factual investigation."). For example, Professor Hovenkamp describes how a monopolist can
use a price squeeze and the reality of a smaller vertical rivals' sunk costs "to effectively transfer to
itself the smaller firm's return on the fixed-cost part of its investment." Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 269 (1985).
42. See Janusz A. Ordover et al., NonPrice Anticompetitive Behavior by Dominant Finns Toward the
2086 [Vol. 87:2079
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Courts have been slow to embrace post-Chicago theories because of the
detailed, fact-specific inquiries required.43 In fact, some scholars argue that the
issues raised in post-Chicago analysis are too complex for antitrust litigation.
44
Others, however, believe that antitrust law is moving in the direction of
complex, fact-specific inquiries. 45 The main impact of post-Chicago theories,
however, has been to show that the Chicago school's generalizations sweep too
broadly. One can describe a variety of individual, precise scenarios in which
Chicago theories do not hold.
II. DEFENSIVE LEVERAGING: THE NEXT STEP IN LEVERAGE THEORY
Defensive leveraging builds on the analysis of both traditional leverage
theorists and the Chicago school. It focuses on two market characteristics: (1)
pricing; and (2) market structure, that is, the number of current competitors in a
market and the potential for future competition.
Traditional leverage theory considers both pricing and structure, but only in
the secondary market. In analyzing structure, traditional theory notes that
leveraging changes the secondary market from a market with many competitors
to a market with only one. In analyzing pricing, traditional theory assumes that
the remaining firm will be able to reap monopoly profits in the secondary
market. All focus, however, remains on the secondary market.
The Chicago school moves one step further. In analyzing pricing, the Chicago
school considers the effect in the primary and secondary markets combined. On
the issue of structure, however, the Chicago school still examines only the
secondary market.
Defensive leveraging theory fills in the next piece of the puzzle. It examines
the effect of leverage on pricing and structure in both markets. It shows that one
cannot appreciate the full impact of leveraging without analyzing the structural
changes in the two markets combined.
Producers of Complementary Products, Discussion Paper in Economics #67, Woodrow Wilson School
of Public and International Affairs 8-9, 10-11 (1984). Ordover shows that the monopolist can reach its
goals by tying the original product to a second, complementary product and driving competitors out of
the second market. The monopolist can then raise prices in the second market and reap the extra
monopoly profit from the second market. In the alternative, Ordover suggests that the monopolist can
reengineer the primary product to make it incompatible with the existing version of the second product.
The monopolist can price the new system low enough to divert all sales from rivals. Thereafter, if the
costs of reverse-engineering the system present a sufficiently high reentry barrier, the monopolist can
raise the price of the new system to reap the full extent of monopoly profits. See id. at 12.
43. See Willard K. Tom, Application of Game Theory to Antitrust: Game Theory in the Everyday
Life of the Antitrust Practitioner, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 457, 458 (1997) (citing Dennis A. Yao &
Susan S. DeSanti, Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Conclusion, 38 ANrIRrUST BULL. 113
(1993)) ("Game Theory has thus far had little direct impact in providing formal models that decide
specific cases or classes of cases.").
44. See Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 261 (describing the controversy over whether antitrust
litigation can effectively deal with the complex issues of strategic behavior); Jacobs, supra note 26, at
38 & n.169.
45. See Jacobs, supra note 26, at 34 (noting that antitrust in general is moving toward a jurispru-
dence of hypercomplexity).
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The following section describes how leveraging helps a monopolist extend
the life of its primary monopoly. This is the key to leverage behavior. Leverag-
ing frequently is not an attempt to reap additional monopoly profit from a
second market. Rather, it is an attempt to use the combined power of multiple
monopolies to prevent the natural erosion of the primary monopoly.
A. THE LIFE CYCLE OF A MONOPOLY: A COMPLEX VIEW
To understand defensive leveraging, one must analyze the life cycle of a
monopoly. Modem legal analysts tend to apply a simplified view of the life
cycle of a monopoly. Most simply note that, in the absence of serious market
imperfections, monopoly profits in a market will lure other firms that will enter
the market and restore competition.46 The analysis implies that new entrants
compete head to head with the monopolist. Faced with direct competition in
precisely the same market, the monopolist would have no choice but to lower
47prices.
There are many reasons why competitors may choose not to meet the
monopolist head on, however, but to enter at a different market point.4 8 These
include lowering the cost of entry, avoiding customer loyalty, breaking network
effects, and skirting legal barriers.
1. Lowering the Cost of Entry
Entry into a new market requires a capital commitment. If the venture fails,
the firm will be unable to recover all of these costs, even after selling all of its
assets. The nonrecoverable costs are referred to as sunk costs.
4 9
A firm may be able to limit sunk costs, however, by entering a smaller portion
of the market, either a smaller geographic section or a more limited product. For
example, a firm may limit sunk costs in the area of research by developing a
product with only a few features rather than a product with many. In addition,
46. For example, Hovenkamp summarizes the Chicago School's basic assumptions about monopoly
in the following manner: "Monopoly, when it exists, tends to be self-correcting; that is, the monopo-
lists's higher profits generally attract new entry into the monopolists's market, with the result that the
monopolist's position is quickly eroded. About the best that the judicial process can do is hasten the
correction process." Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 227; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1984) (arguing that monopoly is self-destructive because monopoly
prices eventually attract entry).
47. But see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing post-Chicago view that firms may
use strategic behavior to raise rivals' costs and reduce competition).
48. Cf Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of Nonfungible
Goods, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1641 (1987). Campbell argues that, even assuming there are no entry
barriers, new entrants will choose to enter at some distance on the product differentiation line from
existing firms because: (1) exact entry is impossible; and (2) entry at an existing point means sharing
profits with the firm already located there whereas entry in unexplored areas offers the possibility of
supracompetitive rates of return in the entrant's own exclusive interval. See id; see also Robert
Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REV. 817, 825-26 (1987) (criticizing Chicago
school for failing to adequately recognize market power based on product differentiation).
49. See Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 265 (describing sunk costs as those costs that the exiting firm
will be unable to recover after selling everything, including goodwill).
2088 [Vol. 87:2079
HeinOnline -- 87 Geo. L.J. 2088 1998-1999
DEFENSIVE LEVERAGING IN ANTITRUST
presenting a low-end or generic brand may involve fewer sunk costs in advertis-
ing. In short, a firm may be able to limit sunk costs and ease entry by entering a
smaller portion of the market.5 ° Similarly, a larger venture may require a longer
start-up time than a smaller venture. By choosing a narrower market, the new
entrant may accelerate its rate of entry.
2. Avoiding Customer Loyalty
A new firm entering the market must overcome the name recognition and
customer loyalty cultivated by the existing firm. Consumers frequently prefer to
buy brands that are familiar. For example, buying a known product saves the
costs and risks associated with evaluating a new product. If consumers know
they like the fit of a particular shoe, they can save time in the future by buying
the same shoe rather than trying on numerous pairs in search of an equivalent
fit. In addition, consumers who are familiar with the quality of a product can
avoid the risks of misjudging new products by continuing to buy the familiar
brand.
If a new entrant tries to meet a monopolist head on, it may run into
established customer loyalty. The new entrant may lessen this inertia by offering
something different, such as a subproduct, a bargain brand, or the next genera-
tion in product development.
3. Breaking Network Effects
In some markets, there is an advantage in doing what others already do.51
This is called a network effect.52 For example, consumers who choose the
popular brand will find it easier to buy complementary products. Those who
own Betamax machines today are unlikely to find many tapes to buy or rent
while those who own VHS machines have no such difficulties. In addition, if a
consumer needs to communicate with other systems, choosing the popular
brand may ease compatibility. 53 Finally, consumers switching to a new product
50. Although limiting sunk costs may make it easier to enter a new market, limiting overall costs
will not necessarily ease entry. In theory, when capital flows freely, a new entrant should have no more
difficulty raising capital for a large venture than for a small one. See generally Kaplow, supra note 14,
at 537-39 (describing the debate over whether the need to enter two markets simultaneously deters
entry). The amount of sunk costs, however, is different. If all other risk factors are equal but one
investment entails greater sunk costs, this investment will be less attractive to lenders and more difficult
for entrants to arrange. See Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 265-66 (noting that the cost of exit operates
as a barrier to entry; where capital flows freely, the fact that it costs $10 million to enter is not as
important as the fact that only 10% can be recovered if the investment proves unprofitable).
51. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product
Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. EcON. REv. 940, 940 (1986).
52. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic
Network Industries, Address before the Software Publishers' Association (Mar. 24, 1998), http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr//public/speeches/161 1.htm [hereinafter Rubinfeld Speech] (noting that network indus-
tries are created by network effects "whereby each individual's demand for a product is positively
related to the usage of other individuals").
53. See Farrell & Saloner, supra note 51, at 940.
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may have to invest in learning new skills. Employers can limit training costs by
buying products that employees already know how to use. With network effects,
even when new technology is better, it is less attractive because it has fewer
users.
5 4
Where network effects exist and one firm has established the industry stan-
dard, it is difficult for new firms to enter. Rather than challenging the standard
bearer head on, a new entrant may try to leapfrog into the next generation of
product development. In other words, rather than trying to fight today's stan-
dard, a new entrant may try to establish the standard for tomorrow. 55
4. Skirting Legal Barriers
In some cases, a new entrant may be unable to challenge the established
monopolist because of legal restrictions. For example, a monopolist may hold
intellectual property rights that prevent a new entrant from challenging it head
on.56 A crafty entrant, however, may be able to carve out portions of the
monopolist's market that are not protected by legal barriers.
B. SPLINTERING AND NEXT-GENERATION SUBSTITUTION: THREATS TO THE
PRIMARY MONOPOLY
As described above, an entrant may be reluctant to compete head on against a
monopolist. Rather, an entrant may choose to attack a portion of the monopo-
lized market, either a smaller geographic section, a generic or lower-end
version, or a more limited product that performs part of the functions of the
monopolist's product or meets more limited market needs. This approach can be
described as splintering.
Mere splintering of the market may not immediately harm a monopolist's
profits. A Chicago school scholar would point out that the monopolist still may
be able to extract the full amount of monopoly profit from the portion of the
market it continues to monopolize.57 For example, suppose a new entrant
splinters the market by creating a limited complimentary product.58 The monopo-
list controls most of the original market but must compete with the new entrant
in the market for the second product. For example, consider a variant on the
camera and film hypothetical described in the introduction. A monopolist
controls the market for cameras used by professional photographers. Assume
54. See id. at 942.
55. The effects of network externalities may be so dangerous to competition and so different from
standard market interactions that they require development of particularized antitrust rules. A full
exploration of the topic is beyond the scope of this work.
56. See SAMUELSON & NoRDHANS, supra note 29, at 507-08 (describing how government can create
entry barriers by granting monopoly rights through patents or by regulating industries such as gas and
electricity).
57. Cf supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (describing Chicago school theory that in the case
of complimentary products, a monopolist can gain all of its monopoly profit from one of the products or
from both of the products combined).
58. The new market is the secondary market.
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that most professional photo shoots occur over a period of days. During this
time, a photographer uses the camera initially for test shots that can give the
photographer a feel for the layout and the lighting of a particular shoot. The
photographer will use the same camera for the final shots.
Suppose a new entrant offers a test shot camera. The test shot camera is of
cheaper quality. Photographers could never use it for the final photos. Neverthe-
less, the test shot camera can produce a quick and inexpensive version of the
photo shoot that is sufficient for testing purposes.
The test shot camera cuts into the monopolist's camera market. Photogra-
phers will buy less of the high-end camera product because the test shot camera
satisfies some of their needs at a lower price. 59
The monopolist, of course, could offer its own test shot camera. If the
monopolist's camera is vastly superior to the interloper's, the interloper's
camera will disappear, forced out by the pressures of a superior product. The
monopolist will again control the same spectrum of the market, but spread
across two products. In a more likely scenario, however, the monopolist will
have to compete against the new entrant in the test camera market. Thus, the
monopolist's original market evolves into two markets: the market for final
photograph cameras and the market for test photo cameras. The monopolist
dominates the first but must compete in the second.
If the market for the second product is perfectly competitive, Chicago school
theories would suggest that the monopolist can extract all of its monopoly profit
from the primary portion of the market. None of the potential monopoly profit
in the system is lost in the secondary product market. The full monopoly profit,
therefore, can be extracted from the primary market. 60 The monopolist may not
lose monopoly profits immediately when a new entrant splinters the market.
Splintering, however, threatens the monopolist's long-term prospects. Once a
new entrant has established a foothold in one comer of the market, the entrant is
in a better position to challenge the monopolist in the full range of the
monopoly market.61 For example, the new entrant can establish a reputation in
the limited market that carries over for entry into the broader market. Consum-
ers who like the entrant's test camera will recognize and respond favorably to
the brand name if the new entrant develops a final photograph camera. If the
new entrant initially faced barriers because of brand loyalty to the monopolist,
the entrant can circumvent this barrier by entering the market step by step.
In addition, reputation value can help the entrant obtain financing for a foray
59. Photographers will still need the high-end camera. They will replace the high-end camera less
frequently, however, because they will use it less frequently. The test shot camera will be doing some of
the work previously done by the high-end camera.
60. If the secondary market is not perfectly competitive, the monopolist can reduce price in the
second market and ensure perfectly competitive pricing.
61. See Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection
Issues, 62 B.U. L. REv. 661, 670 (1982) (describing how a monopolist that eliminates independent
producers of a tied product may raise barriers in the tying market by eliminating potential entrants).
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into the broader market. Although lenders may be reluctant to help an unproven
candidate, they may be more willing to assist a firm that has established itself in
a related market.62
Experience in a related market also helps the new entrant move into the
broader market. Experience making one kind of camera, for example, will help
the new entrant develop other kinds of cameras.6 3 The entrant gains experience
in a variety of areas including the technology of the product, consumer tastes,
and product life cycles. 64
In short, splintering poses a significant threat to the long-term viability of a
monopoly. Entrants in the splintered market are poised to become successful
competitors in the broad market. Thus, although the monopolist may not lose
monopoly profits immediately through splintering, splintering threatens the
monopolist's long-term ability to maintain its market power.
Next-generation substitution poses an even more immediate threat. Recall
that a new entrant may try to jump into the next generation of product
development. Rather than offering another camera, for example, a new entrant
could try to offer a new approach to image development. The entrant then
presents its product as the next-generation substitution. As a direct substitute,
the new product presents a direct and immediate challenge to a monopolist's
market power.
C. HOW LEVERAGING PREVENTS SPLINTERING AND
NEXT-GENERATION SUBSTITUTION
Leverage is an effective response to splintering and next-generation substitu-
tion. If an entrant tries to split off portions of the monopolized market, the
monopolist can use leverage to tie the two markets back together. The monopo-
list extends the power from its core stronghold into the wayward portion of the
market. It can thereby strangle the new competitor and maintain the full scope
of its original monopoly.
In the test camera scenario described above, suppose the camera monopolist
ties its two cameras together. Photographers can only buy the high-end camera
if they agree to buy the monopolist's test shot camera. The monopolist could
accomplish the same result by bundling the two cameras, that is, by offering the
62. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARcmEs: ANALYsIs AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
111-12 (1975) (describing why experience counts when trying to obtain financing).
63. See id. at 112 (concluding that learning by doing yields significant cost advantages).
64. Even legal barriers may be weakened somewhat by entering a comer of the market. Suppose the
entrant cannot enter the broad market because of patent restrictions. When the patent expires, the
entrant will be poised to expand into the broader market. The entrant's experience and reputation in a
limited area of the market will allow it to enter the broad market faster and more effectively than if the
entrant were starting from scratch. Experience in a limited area may even affect licensing barriers. If the
new entrant can establish a positive reputation in a limited area, it may convince licensing authorities to
ease restrictions and permit wider entry.
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two cameras only as a package at one price.65 If consumers get the monopolist's
test shot camera along with the high-end camera, they will not purchase the
entrant's test shot camera.66 The new entrant will drop out of the market, and
the monopolist's market power will be preserved.
One could imagine a similar scenario with the development of a generic
version of a product. Suppose a new entrant splinters a manufacturing market
by offering a generic brand of the manufactured good, such as cigarettes. From
the consumer's standpoint, the generic version is not a complimentary product,
but a substitute. The consumer would purchase either the high-end cigarettes or
the generic brand. The monopolist could develop its own generic version. It
could not, however, leverage by tying the two goods together if the consumer
would use only one.
From a retailer's standpoint, however, the products are compliments. A
retailer such as a convenience store may wish to carry both high-end cigarettes
and a low-end brand. The monopolist could use its power in the high-end
market to insist that retailers carry its version of the generic product and not the
new entrant's. The monopolist thereby succeeds in driving the entrant out of the
market and preserving its original monopoly.
In short, if a new entrant threatens to erode the monopoly by splitting off a
limited portion of the market, the monopolist can respond by leveraging power
from its stronghold into the limited portion of the market. The monopolist
succeeds in driving out the new competitor, thereby protecting its monopoly.
This is defensive leveraging: using the power of combined markets to prevent
erosion of the original monopoly.
Depending on the strength of the monopoly and the effectiveness of the
leverage, defensive leveraging may either substantially delay monopoly erosion
or prevent it altogether. Even if defensive leveraging only delays erosion, the
effect is significant for antitrust policy. In the words of Professor Areeda:
Antitrust's concern is not merely with market power that may be exercised
indefinitely but also with market power that can be exercised for a substantial
period of time As a result, the distinction between [delayed entry and perma-
nent exclusion] is generally irrelevant to antitrust policy, although the ques-
tion of how long entry will be deterred is certainly relevant.
6 7
Defensive leveraging also can be used to prevent next-generation substitu-
65. See generally 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 13, 1755-1756, at 311-35 (detailing various
uncommunicated tying arrangements including bundling).
66. Cf. Kurt A. Strasser, Antitrust Policy in Agreements for Distributor Exclusivity, 16 CONN. L. REV.
969, 982-83 (1984). Strasser argues that when inputs can be used in variable proportions, a monopolist
supplier has an incentive to integrate forward to keep buyers from substituting other inputs for the one
over which the monopolist has power. See id.
67. 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 420c, at 60-61 (revised ed.
1995).
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tion, particularly in industries that exhibit network externalities. 68 As described
above, in some markets, consumers fare better if they own the same product as
everyone else. A new entrant may try to avoid this barrier by producing the next
generation of a product. In other words, if the name of the game is "who has the
most customers," a new entrant will automatically lose in the current market. It
can avoid the problem, however, by developing a new product market in which
no one has any customers. In theory, the new market has a level playing field,
and all entrants have the same chance of success.
Defensive leveraging can block this strategy. A monopolist can leverage the
power of its existing customer base into the new market thereby dominating the
new technology and crushing challengers. The monopolist is not trying to reap
additional monopoly profit by projecting its power into the second market. It is
trying to prevent extinction of its primary monopoly. Once a monopolist has
blocked an attempt at next-generation substitution, the strategy has a deterrent
effect.6 9 Potential entrants are less likely to search for new technologies and
enter the fray for fear that their efforts will be blocked. As a result, in the
next-generation scenario, defensive leveraging damages competition in two
ways: 70 First, it prevents the natural erosion of a monopoly; second, it inhibits
innovation.7'
For example, imagine a telephone system in which customers could only talk
to people who subscribe to the same phone system. In this market, one firm has
emerged as the overwhelming monopolist because the largest number of subscrib-
ers have joined its system. New customers are reluctant to choose another
system, even a better one, because they would be unable to connect to many
people. Suppose further that a new firm develops cellular phones. Users could
travel anywhere with the new phones. In addition, cellular customers could talk
to users on any other cellular system.
The new phones would threaten to erode the basic phone monopoly. Having a
large customer base is not important in the cellular market because cellular
callers can talk to callers from any other cellular system. If users like the
68. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55 (describing network effects).
69. Cf Campbell, supra note 48, at 1653 (describing the deterrence value of predatory strategies).
70. Cf Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 40, at 246 (noting that potential competition provides a
competitive check on established firms distinct from the check that established firms exert on each
other; if exclusionary rights raise entry barriers, this will enhance established firms' power to raise
prices).
71. Professor Rubinfeld makes the following comments about leveraging in the context of dynamic
network industries:
One troubling aspect of leveraging is the possibility that innovation incentives of competitors
will be decreased. Such a blunting of incentives can occur if the leveraging practice is
undertaken not primarily as part of a vigorous competitive strategy, but in part to decrease the
likelihood of competitor entry, so that the dominant firm will continue to be victorious in the
competition for the next market.
Rubinfeld Speech, supra note 52, at 24; cf Sullivan & Jones, supra note 7, at 175 (discussing how the
prohibition on leveraging can protect innovation).
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convenience of cellular phones, they conceivably could switch more and more
calls to the cellular system, a market in which the monopolist has no advantage.
Over time, the primary phone market, which the monopolist dominates, could
become smaller and smaller, replaced by a market in which open competition
prevails.
Defensive leveraging can block this strategy. When the cellular market is in
its infancy, the monopolist could develop a cellular phone and bundle it with the
basic phone. The monopolist could thereby ensure a large customer base in the
new market. In addition, if enough customers receive cellular phones from the
monopolist, the new entrant might be unable to generate enough sales to
survive. Thus, the monopolist could enter the cellular market unchallenged. 72 It
has used leverage to transform its old monopoly into a new generation mo-
nopoly.
7 3
In the lifecycle of a monopoly, new entrants may choose to enter the market
by splintering off a portion of the monopolist's market or jumping into the next
generation of product development. A monopolist blocks these challenges through
defensive leveraging: Using power in the primary market, the monopolist
projects into the newly splintered or newly developed market and dominates
both. This is the essence of defensive leveraging. It is not an attempt to reap
additional monopoly profit from a second market. It is an effort to protect the
primary monopoly from the natural forces of competition.
D. THREE EXAMPLES OF DEFENSIVE LEVERAGING IN MODERN MARKETS
The previous section described the theory of defensive leveraging. It demon-
strated that a monopolist may engage in leveraging behavior, not to reap
72. A particularly aggressive monopolist could try a more dangerous strategy. Remember that the
monopolist has a substantial advantage in the basic phone market because callers can only talk to other
callers on the same system. This network effect helps to reinforce the monopoly in the basic phone
market. The cellular market lacks this network effect. Thus, even if the monopolist succeeds in
dominating the cellular market, it will have no network effects to reinforce its market position. The best
scenario for the monopolist would be to dominate a next-generation market which is also characterized
by network effects.
The monopolist could try to leverage into this best case scenario. For example, suppose that in
the infancy of the cellular market, the monopolist bundles basic phones with cellular phones that
can only speak to users of the same system. Given that most people subscribe to the monopolist's
system, the monopolist could hope that its customers will see the open cellular system as unnecessary.
If customers are unconvinced and begin purchasing the open cellular phones anyway, the monopo-
list can switch tactics and bundle open cellular phones. The strategy is quite risky. The monopolist
must be able to choose the perfect moment when bundling limited phones has failed but the advan-
tage of the monopolist's installed base is still strong enough to project into the new open cellular
market.
73. The next-generation market does not have the same network effects as the old-generation
monopoly because cellular phones on any system can connect to any other cellular system. Thus, the
monopolist's power is not as well protected in the new market, unless the monopolist can develop other
ways to deter competition. At the very least, however, the monopolist has avoided the extinction of its
primary monopoly.
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additional monopoly profit from a second market, but to prevent the natural
erosion of the primary monopoly. The following section presents three ex-
amples of defensive leveraging in modem markets.
1. Microsoft's Behavior in the Operating System Market
Microsoft makes operating systems for the personal computer ("PC")
market. An operating system manages the interaction between a personal
computer's central processing unit ("CPU") and various pieces of hardware
such as printers and monitors. It also manages the interaction between the
CPU and software, such as word processing programs and spreadsheet pro-
grams.
The operating system market exhibits network effects.7 4 Consumers want
operating systems that can run many software programs. Thus, PC users tend to
choose the operating system that has the greatest number, variety, and quality of
software available for it.75 Similarly, software developers prefer to write pro-
grams for operating systems that are used by many consumers. Developers are
unlikely to write for fledgling systems because there are so few potential
customers. Thus, new entrants into the operating system market would find it
difficult to compete because buyers could not find much software for the new
system.
76
Microsoft has a monopoly in the operating system market. The dominant type
of PC in the United States is Intel-based. Microsoft's operating system, Win-
dows, is used in over 80% of Intel-based computers.77 In addition, 90% of new
Intel-based PCs are shipped with Windows already installed.78
a. Internet browsers. Internet browsers are software programs that allow PC
users to interact with the world wide web. The browser can locate, access and
74. See Rubinfeld Speech, supra note 52, at 3; see generally supra text accompanying notes 51-55
(describing network effects in which each individual's demand for a product is positively related to the
usage of other individuals).
75. See Rubinfeld Speech, supra note 52, at 3.
76. Cf Farrell & Saloner, supra note 51, at 942 (explaining that early adopters of a new technology
bear a disproportionate share of incompatibility costs). In addition, buyers would be reluctant to choose
a new operating system because of the retraining required.
77. See Justice Dep't Complaint 2, United States v. Microsoft Corp. (D.D.C. May 18, 1998)
[hereinafter Justice Dep't Complaint]; Jay Dratler, Jr., Microsoft as an Antitrust Target: IBM in
Software?, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 671, 674 n.14 (1996) (citing academic, press, and court documents to
show that Microsoft dominates the operating systems market and that its market share is estimated at
80%); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Microsoft
dominates the world market for operating systems software that runs on IBM-compatible personal
computers."). But see Defendant Microsoft Corp.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 20 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 1998) (asserting that Microsoft's large market share does
not constitute monopoly power).
78. See Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d at 1451. In 1998, Microsoft introduced a new version of Windows
entitled Windows 98. The prior version is called Windows 95.
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display information from the web. Browsers also can run programs located on
the web, as long as the program is written for the browser. In 1996, Netscape
Communications had an 80% market share in internet browsers.7 9 In early
1996, Microsoft's browser share was less than 5%.80
b. Leverage behavior Microsoft has waged an aggressive campaign to in-
crease its share of the internet browser market. Internal Microsoft documents,
cited by the Justice Department, show that the company feared it could not
compete in the browser market on the merits of its products. These documents
repeatedly conclude that Microsoft must leverage its power in the operating
system market to prevail in the browser market.81 For example, Microsoft's
Christian Wildfeuer wrote: "[I]t seems clear that it will be very hard to increase
browser market share on the merits of [the Microsoft browser] alone. It will be
more important to leverage the [operating system] asset to make people use [the
Microsoft browser] instead of Navigator." 
82
Microsoft has indeed leveraged its power from the operating system market
into the browser market. In order to obtain a license for Windows 95, Microsoft
requires PC manufacturers to agree to license, preinstall, and distribute the
Microsoft browser on every Windows PC shipped.83 The same is true for
Windows 98.84 In other words, if PC manufacturers want Windows, they must
also take Microsoft's browser. In addition, Microsoft has taken further steps to
ensure that its browser remains the only browser on the Windows operating
system. For example, Microsoft's contracts forbid PC manufacturers from
removing Microsoft's browser or adding a competing browser. According to
Microsoft's internal documents, customers have asked to remove the Microsoft
browser, but Microsoft has refused.85 Microsoft, furthermore, has designed
Windows 98 so that removing the Microsoft browser is more difficult than it
was with Windows 95.86
Microsoft's foray into the browser market has been stunningly successful.
Microsoft's share of the internet browser market has grown from less than 5%
in early 1996 to approximately 50% in May of 1998.87
79. See Dratler, supra note 77, at 735.
80. Justice Dep't Complaint, supra note 77, 64.
81. Microsoft employees refer to the Microsoft browser as "LE" or "IE 4," the Microsoft operating
system as "O/S," and the Netscape browser as "Navigator" or "nav."
82. Justice Dep't Complaint, supra note 77, 114(a). Similarly, Microsoft's Senior Vice President
James Allchin wrote that unless Microsoft were to "leverage Windows .... I don't understand how IE
is going to win." Id. 114(b). In the same vein, another Microsoft document notes that "if we take
away IE from the O/S, most nav users will never switch to us." Id. 114(f).
83. See Justice Dep't Complaint, supra note 77, 10.
84. See id.
85. See id. 116.
86. See id.
87. See id. 126.
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c. Why is Microsoft leveraging into the browser market?88 It is clear that
Microsoft is leveraging its power from the operating system market into the
browser market in an effort to dominate both. Why is Microsoft engaging in this
behavior? Is it to extract additional monopoly profit by dominating a second
market? According to the Chicago school analysis, this is unlikely. Operating
systems and browsers are complements in the computer market. Consumers use
the two together as part of a package of computer products. Thus, if Microsoft
monopolizes the browser market and tries to extract monopoly profit, presum-
ably, it would earn less monopoly profit from its operating system. The stakes
for Microsoft, however, are considerably higher than adding a little more
monopoly profit. Browsers threaten to make the choice of operating system
irrelevant, or at least much less important. Microsoft is battling to prevent the
erosion of its core operating system monopoly.
Browsers create a layer between the operating system and the software
program. Not only can operating systems run programs; browsers can run
programs. Thus, if software programmers begin writing for browsers, the choice
of operating system becomes irrelevant. A consumer could purchase an innova-
tive operating system without worrying whether software will be available
because the consumer could access software through the browser. Thus, the
network effect of being the dominant operating system loses much of its power.
Internal Microsoft documents quoted in the Justice Department complaint
show that Microsoft views the browser wars as an effort to protect its primary
operating systems monopoly. For example, one Microsoft document notes that
"[lthe Internet Battle" is "not about browsers. [Our] competitors are trying to
create an alternative platform to Windows."' 89 Similarly, another Microsoft
executive, lamenting Netscape's intrusion into "Windows Paradise," notes that
"[t]he situation is threatening our operating systems and desktop applications
share at a fundamental level." 90 Thus, Microsoft is leveraging into browsers for
one key reason: to prevent browsers from eroding Microsoft's formidable
monopoly in the operating systems market. This is classic defensive leveraging.
88. The Justice Department and the attorneys general of 19 states and the District of Columbia filed
suit against Microsoft alleging that a variety of Microsoft's actions violate the antitrust laws. See Justice
Dep't Complaint, supra note 77; Defendant Microsoft Corp.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, supra note 77. I will discuss only one aspect of Microsoft's
behavior-Microsoft's use of its power in the operating system market to control sales in the internet
browser market-as an example of defensive leveraging.
89. Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 21, United
States v. Microsoft Corp. (D.D.C. May 18, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/11700/1762.htm>
(emphasis in original) (citing internal document written by Brad Silverberg of Microsoft).
90. Id. (quoting document written by Jeff Raikes, Microsoft's Group Vice President for North
American Sales); see also id. (quoting Microsoft document written by Brad Chase that warns of the
potential danger that a competing internet browser could eventually "obsolete Windows"); id. (quoting
memo by Microsoft Group Vice President for Platforms and Applications, Paul Maritz, explaining that
job #1 at Microsoft is browser share and stating that Microsoft must "fundamentally blunt" the
momentum supported by cross-platform browsers to "protect our core asset Windows-the thing we
get paid $'s for").
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A monopolist, faced with a next-generation product that threatens its monopoly,
leverages the power from its primary market into the new market in order to
protect its monopoly position.91
2. Competition Between Physicians and Nonphysicians
Competition between physicians and nonphysicians provides another current
example of defensive leveraging at work. Physicians in this country tradition-
ally faced little, if any, competition from outside groups. Although doctors
competed among themselves, no other professionals had both the skills and the
licensing necessary to offer similar services. Over time, however, various
groups of health professionals have begun to compete directly with physicians
in particular practice areas. Such nonphysician groups include nurse anesthe-
tists, 92 podiatrists,9 3 chiropractors, 94 nurse midwives, 95 and psychologists. In
order to compete effectively with physicians, nonphysicians need access to
hospital and clinic facilities.
The general requirements for hospital privileges are issued by the Joint
91. Professors Farrell & Saloner describe similar behavior in the context of predatory pricing. Their
hypothetical involves only one product market rather than leveraging between two products. See Farrell
& Saloner, supra note 51, at 943 (describing how an incumbent monopolist, facing the threat of
competitive entry by a new technology, can engage in temporary price reductions until the installed
base is large enough to make entry by the new technology impossible).
One could argue that because Netscape had a large market share in browsers in 1996, Microsoft was
merely leveraging to break Netscape's network effects. According to this argument, we should applaud
Microsoft's behavior because it resulted in breaking another stronghold. Even assuming that Netscape
had a browser monopoly in 1996, the argument would fail. The key goal in breaking network effects is
to provide for free competition. Allowing one monopolist to replace another monopolist does not move
us any closer to the goal of free competition. In addition, the analysis still assumes that the issue is
domination of the secondary market. As Chicago school analysts have pointed out, Microsoft cannot
gain more monopoly profits by dominating the secondary market. Microsoft is not trying to open up
competition in the browser market. Microsoft is trying to preserve its operating system monopoly.
92. Nurse anesthetists are registered nurses with at least two years of additional training in
administering anesthesia. See Note, Denying Hospital Privileges to Non-Physicians: Does Quality of
Care Justify a Potential Restraint of Trade?, 19 IND. L. REV. 1219, 1226 (1986). Nurse anesthetists are
licensed to perform some of the anesthesia services provided by physician anesthesiologists but are not
trained or licensed to perform more complicated procedures. See Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d
1404, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991).
93. Podiatrists treat diseases of the foot. Podiatrists receive four years of postgraduate training at
schools of podiatry. See Edward E. Hollowell, The Growing Legal Contest-Hospital Privileges for
Podiatrists, 23 ST. Louis U. L.J., 491, 492 n.8 (1979). In most states, podiatrists are licensed to
prescribe drugs, administer local anesthesia, and perform minor surgery related to the foot but not to
perform amputations. See id. at 492.
94. Chiropractors compete with orthopedists and other physicians in the treatment of musculoskel-
etal problems. See Thomas E. Kauper, The Role of Quality of Health Care Considerations in Antitrust
Analysis, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, at 274, 320. A chiropractor's primary therapeutic
tool is spinal manipulation. See Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 719 E2d 207, 213 (7th Cir. 1983).
Although such therapy generally does not require hospitalization, chiropractors use x-ray and hospital
laboratory services.
95. Certified nurse midwives are registered nurses who receive additional training in pregnancy,
birth, and postpartum care for normal pregnancies. See Note, Hospital Privileges for Nurse-Midwives:
An Examination Under Antitrust Law, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 959, 960, 963 n.22 (1984). Nurse midwives
work with a collaborating obstetrician, to whom they can refer patients if complications arise.
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Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).96 Until fifteen years ago, the
JCAH required that accredited hospitals grant privileges only to physicians. 97 In
1983, however, the JCAH modified its standards, allowing hospitals the option
of granting privileges to nonphysicians.98 Despite the change, many hospitals
have chosen to maintain a physician-only policy.
Within each hospital, physicians generally control decisions concerning hospi-
tal privileges. Physicians who have staff privileges at the hospital appoint a
committee to make recommendations concerning privileges. 99 The hospital's
governing board makes the final decision, but the board rarely departs from the
medical staff's recommendations. 1°° Thus, physicians control access to hospi-
tals, and nonphysician competitors find it difficult to gain such access.
Nonphysician groups have advanced a variety of antitrust arguments in their
efforts to gain access to hospitals.1 °' Most of the cases follow a common fact
pattern: Nonphysician plaintiffs claim that individual physicians, or physician
groups, have conspired among themselves and with hospitals to prevent the
nonphysicians from gaining access to hospitals. 10 2 In some cases, nonphysicians
96. See Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional
Relationships, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1071, 1087.
97. See John J. Miles, Antitrust, Hospital Staff Privilege Decisions and Hospital Joint Ventures, 17
TOLEDO L. REV. 873, 886 (1986).
98. See Havighurst, supra note 96, at 1090 n.57. At the time of the change, the prior standard was
the subject of an antitrust suit by clinical psychologists against the JCAH in Ohio. The prior standard
also had been challenged in a suit by podiatrists. See id. (citing Ohio v. JCAH, No. C2791158 (S.D.
Ohio, filed Dec. 14, 1979) (dismissed as moot) and Levin v. JCAH, 354 F.2d 515, 517 (D.C. Cir.
1965)).
99. See Levin, 354 F.2d at 517.
100. Philip C. Kissam et al., Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70
CAL. L. REV. 595, 608 (1982).
101. Some nonphysicians have brought constitutional claims, alleging that a hospital violated equal
protection or due process rights by denying access to nonphysicians. Nonphysicians alleged state action
based on the fact that the hospital was state-owned or that the state was involved in licensing and
regulation of hospitals. Nonphysicians consistently have lost on such claims. See Hayman v. City of
Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927); Shaw v. Hospital Auth. of Cobb, 614 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980); Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 542 F.2d 792 (9th Cit. 1976);
Kaczanowski v. Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vt. 612 F. Supp. 688 (D. Vt. 1985); Feldman v. Jackson Mem'l
Hosp., 509 F. Supp. 815 (S.D. Fla. 1981), aft'd, 752 F.2d 647 (lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1029 (1985); see also Note, Health Professionals'Access to Hospitals: A Retrospective and Prospective
Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1186 (1981).
102. The cases have met with only limited success in the courts. See Oltz v. St. Peter's Community
Hosp., 861 F2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding jury verdict for nurse anesthetist on Sherman Act § I
claim); Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc., 789 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 972 (1986) (affirming summary judgment against podiatrists on Sherman Act §§ 1 & 2 claims);
Levin v. Joint Comm. on Accreditation of Hosps., 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam)
(reversing summary judgment against podiatrists); Anesthesia Advantage, Inc. v. Metz Group, 759 F
Supp. 638 (D. Colo. 1991) (granting summary judgment against nurse anesthetists on Sherman Act § I
claims); Kaczanowski v. Medical Ctr Hosp. of Vt., 612 F. Supp. at 688 (granting summary judgment
against podiatrists on Sherman Act §§ 1 & 2 claims); Feldman, 571 F. Supp. at 1000 (S.D. Fla. 1983),
affd, 752 F.2d 647 (11th Cit. 1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1029 (1985) (directing verdict against
podiatrists on Sherman Act §§ 1 & 2 claims); Health Care Management Corp, 107 ET.C. 285 (1986)
(entering consent order to prevent restraints on podiatrists); see also Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 719
F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983) (ordering new trial after verdict against chiropractors who claimed professional
2100
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allege that physician groups that compete with nonphysicians agree to provide
services for a hospital only if the hospital agrees not to grant privileges to
nonphysician competitors. In other cases, nonphysicians allege that the staff
physicians as a whole use their power to convince hospitals to exclude nonphysi-
cians. 1
0 3
Defensive leveraging theory explains what is happening in this portion of the
market for medical services. Although physicians traditionally have competed
against each other, they have not engaged in intensive price competition. In the
words of one scholar, of all the private professions, medicine has been the most
successful in shielding its compensation from the "chill winds of competi-
tion." 104 As a result, physicians consistently are able to price their services at
rates higher than a competitive market would allow. 1
0 5
Various characteristics of the medical services market contribute to a physi-
cian's ability to charge supracompetitive prices. First, because medicine is a
technical field, consumers lack the information to make rational choices about
the quality of services and the proper amount to purchase. 10 6 The average
consumer will have difficulty evaluating, for example, whether to have heart
surgery or simply to take heart medication.
Lack of information harms competition for medical services in several ways.
Consumers are unlikely to encourage price competition because they are unable
to evaluate the quality of the product and to weigh the tradeoffs between price
and quality. In addition, consumers are dependent on the supplier, the physician,
to determine the level of demand. Patients usually look to the physician to
decide everything from the frequency of physicals to the need for surgery. As
one scholar commented, "[w]e really don't know what to buy, and must trust
the seller to tell us."' 10 7 Controlling the demand for services contributes to a
physician's ability to charge supracompetitive prices.
Consumers also face greater penalties for making improper purchasing choices
in the market for medical services than in ordinary consumer markets. For
physicians' organizations conspired to eliminate chiropractic profession by refusing to engage in any
professional research, education, or other dealings with chiropractors); North Carolina Orthopedic
Ass'n, FTC Complaints & Orders 23, 436 [ 1 22,364] (Oct. 7, 1986) (entering order in which association
agrees not to urge members to pursue changes of hospital bylaws to exclude podiatrists).
103. Physicians who do not compete directly with nonphysicians have an interest in maintaining the
mystique that "only a doctor can do it." All physicians may be worried that groups of nonphysicians
will arise to compete with elements of the services they provide. Cf Note, Denying Hospital Privileges
to NonPhysicians, supra note 92, at 1230 & nn.85-86 (noting that even if there are no competing
physicians on staff, the importance of referrals and peer pressure could lead other doctors to conform to
their colleagues' wishes).
104. DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: How ExEcuTIVEs AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND How IT
AFFECTS AMERICA 119 (1993).
105. See id.; see also infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
106. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and Reforming
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 460 (1994); Justin B.
Nelsen, Delineation of the Proper Geographic Market in Antitrust Cases Involving Physician Services,
16 J.L. & COM. 1, 28 (1996).
107. Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 106, at 460.
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example, if a consumer purchases an inadequate laundry detergent, the con-
sumer ends up with stained clothing. If a consumer purchases inadequate
medical services, the consumer could die. This tends to encourage over-
purchasing and price inelasticity in the medical field. 
10 8
Finally, physicians are able to charge supracompetitive prices because consum-
ers are insulated from the full price of the services they purchase. As Milton
Friedman has commented, "few consumers of health care now pay for their
care directly, and no one spends someone else's money-the employer's, the
insurance company's, or the government's-as carefully as he or she spends his
or her own." 1 09
Managed care complicates the pricing picture in the medical services indus-
try. One would expect third-party payers such as insurance companies and
Medicare to constrain physicians' ability to fully exploit their market power.
Although third-party payers may have had an effect on physician compensation,
they have not induced open price competition. American physicians continue to
exhibit the power to charge prices above competitive rates. Despite the explo-
sion of managed care, for example, physician earnings have not declined. In
fact, they have continued to rise at a rate exceeding inflation."0 Scholars
continue to conclude that physicians charge prices above competitive rates."l'
The key to physicians' continuing market power is licensing restrictions. "It
is an article of faith in the economics professions, particularly the field of
microeconomics, that licensure provisions decrease the supply of available
physicians and increase their cost." 11 2 Restrictive licensing practices ensure that
medical care will be undersupplied and the cost of medical care will be too
high.' ' 3 By limiting the supply of providers, the medical profession induces
supracompetitive prices.
Nonphysicians threaten to dampen the power of the licensing restrictions.
Before the emergence of nonphysicians, consumers could purchase a single
product, medical services. The product could be purchased from only one type
of supplier-a doctor. Now, some medical services are divided into high-end and
108. Nelsen, supra note 106, at 27-28 (discussing price inelasticity in the medical field).
109. Milton Friedman, Letter to the Editor, It Looks Like a Health Crisis to Us, WALL ST. J., Feb 9,
1994, at All; see also Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 106, at 460 (noting that less than one-quarter of
healthcare payments are out of pocket); Nelsen, supra note 106, at 28 (concluding that most consumers
are unaware of actual health care costs; a typical consumer is only aware of the monthly premium).
110. See BOK, supra note 104, at 120. The average American physician also earns more in
comparison to other American workers than physicians do in other countries. American physicians earn
5.4 times the pay of a typical American worker compared with 4.3 in Germany, 3.8 in Canada and 2.5
in Great Britain. See id. at 121.
111. See id. at 121 (showing that by every plausible measure, most American physicians receive
substantially more in earnings than a competitive market would allow); Nelsen, supra note 106, at 47
(citing empirical studies showing that supracompetitive pricing is the rule rather than the exception in
most healthcare service markets).
112. Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 106, at 470.
113. See id.
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low-end services. High-end services are sold only by physicians, but low-end
services are sold by both physicians and nonphysicians. 1 4 Thus, nonphysicians
have succeeded in splintering the market for medical services. Although physi-
cians still maintain sole licensing in large areas of medical services, nonphysi-
cians, over time, may move to challenge more and more of the licensing
restrictions." 5
With the emergence of new competitors and the evolution of the product,
doctors are in danger of losing their market power. The doctors' primary
monopoly is eroding because of splintering resulting from competitors in a new,
low-end market. The physician response is defensive leveraging. Physicians use
the power from their core stronghold, high-end medical services, to exclude
competitors from the newly splintered market. Physicians who compete with
nonphysicians may insist on providing a full array of services as a package. In
other words, if a hospital wants high-end services, it must agree to purchase
low-end services from the physician as well. In the alternative, physicians who
do not compete against nonphysicians may use their power to induce hospitals
to exclude nonphysicians. If the behavior succeeds, physicians will maintain
their power over price in the full range of medical services.
Physicians are not trying to increase monopoly profits by leveraging from
high-end services into a second low-end market. Rather, they are using existing
market power to defend a current market position threatened with erosion.1
1 6
This is defensive leveraging.
3. Eli Lilly's Behavior in the Market for Cephalosporins
Some firms offer discounts or rebates to customers who use more than one of
114. Nonphysicians charge less than physicians. See Nurse Midwifery Assoc. v. Hibbett, 549 F.
Supp. 1185, 1188 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (containing allegation that maternity costs in the relevant market
would be higher without nurse midwives); FTC, Attorney General Come to Rescue of California
CRNA, 85 AM. J. NURSING 601, 601, 608 (1985) (noting that nurse anesthetists charge less than
anesthesiologists); Faith Tanney, Hospital Privileges for Psychologists-A Legislative Model, 38 AM.
PSYCHOL. 1232, 1233 (1983) (noting that psychologists charge less than psychiatrists); Note, Denying
Hospital Privileges to Non-Physicians, supra note 92, at 1246-47 & nn.197-200 (1986) (citing
AMERICAN PODIATRIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, FOOT CARE: A MAJOR PRODUCT LINE FOR TODAY'S
COMPETITIVE HOSPITAL MARKETPLACE 4 (1985)) (noting that podiatrists charge less than orthopedists).
115. In fact, another group of health professionals, osteopaths, currently competes with traditional
medical doctors. Osteopaths are similar to the nonphysician groups in that their training is less
expensive, they typically offer lower rates, and they are perceived by traditional medical doctors as
nonscientific outsiders. See Erwin A. Blackstone, The AMA and the Osteopaths: A Study of the Power
of Organized Medicine, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 405, 407 (1977) (finding that the cost of training
osteopaths is significantly lower than the cost of training medical doctors given the greater emphasis in
osteopath training on general practice rather than research). Osteopaths, however, compete across a
broad spectrum with physicians who practice general medicine. See id. Thus, another group of
professionals already competes with certain physicians in the full range of their market.
116. Cf Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints Among Hospitals, Physicians and Health Insurers
that Raise Rivals' Costs, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 150 (1988) (applying post-Chicago game theory to
describe how vertical restraints among hospitals, doctors, and health insurers may create market power
by raising costs for existing and potential competitors).
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the firm's products. These promotions have been called "package discounts,"' 17
"bundled discounts," " 8 or "quantity discounts."119 Not all package discounts
are dangerous to competition. 20 A firm, however, can design a package dis-
count in a way that allows a monopolist to engage in defensive leveraging. I call
this type of promotion a leveraged discount.
a. Leveraged discounts in the abstract. Consider a product market that was
once dominated by a single firm. The market has splintered into three subprod-
ucts, A, B, and C. The monopolist produces all three subproducts and continues
to hold a monopoly in products A and B. A new entrant, however, competes in
the C market. The C market is an effective foothold for eventually challenging
the monopolist in A and B as well.
Suppose the monopolist crafts a purchase incentive program. The program
begins the way most volume discounts do-the more you purchase, the lower
the price per unit. In order to receive the best price, however, the customer must
accumulate its purchases across several of the monopolist's products. It is not
enough to buy a sufficient volume of product A. The customer must also buy
some amount of products B and C as well. Once the customer reaches a
sufficient volume of A, B, and C, the price of each will fall.
The C market entrant could try to compete by matching the monopolist's
incentives. The entrant, however, cannot just match the monopolist's lowest
price for C. In order to compete effectively, the entrant would have to offer a
large enough discount on C to cover the discounts that the customer is forgoing
on A and B as a result of buying C elsewhere. In other words, the entrant must
offer a C discount equal to the value of the monopolist's combined discounts on
A, B and C. The burden of providing such a steep discount would drive the new
entrant out of the C market.
The monopolist in this case is not trying to leverage into the C market to gain
additional monopoly profits in C. The monopolist is trying to prevent the C
entrant from establishing a sufficient foothold to challenge the full range of the
monopolist's market in A, B and C.1
2 1
b. Leveraged discounts in the case of SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co.'
22
Eli Lilly produced and distributed a class of antibiotic drugs known as
117. 10 AREEDA Er AL., supra note 13, 1758, at 341.
118. Lepage's Inc. v. 3M, No. 97-3983, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18501 (E.D. Penn Nov. 14, 1997).
119. 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRUST LAW 1807c, at 118 (1998).
120. See 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 13, 1758, at 341; 11 HOVENKAMP, supra note 119, 1807c,
at 119.
121. Remember that the monopolist does not necessarily lose the opportunity for monopoly profits
when C market becomes competitive. The monopolist may be able to extract its full amount of
monopoly profits from its remaining monopoly in markets A and B. See supra text accompanying notes
56-61 (describing splintering). The danger exists if the new entrant eventually challenges all of the
markets, thereby eroding the full range of the monopoly.
122. 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978).
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cephalosporins. Lilly supplied 90% of the cephalosporins used by nonprofit
hospitals in the United States.
1 23
For nine years, Lilly's patents gave the firm a complete monopoly in the
relevant market for cephalosporins.' 24 Later, however, other firms introduced
new varieties of cephalosporins that were not covered by Lilly's patents. In
particular, SmithKline Corporation entered the market with two new versions of
cephalosporins. SmithKline viewed these two drugs as the first in a series of
specialty antibiotics that it intended to pursue. 12 5 In other words, SmithKline,
the new entrant, developed a limited range of products as a first step in a
broader assault. Within a year, SmithKline's two drugs accounted for 8.5% of
the cephalosporin market, making SmithKline the most significant challenger to
Lilly.
126
Lilly responded by introducing its own versions of the new cephalosporins.
In addition, Lilly introduced a rebate plan similar to the one outlined above. In
order to obtain the best price for each item under Lilly's plan, a hospital had to
purchase minimum quantities of any three of Lilly's five cephalosporins. 1 27 The
rebate was designed so that a hospital would have to purchase the Lilly product
that competed with SmithKline's key product. In fact, Lilly's sales representa-
tives were told to emphasize that the rebate was an inducement to buy Lilly
over SmithKline. 28 Lilly gave charts to its sales representative showing that
SmithKline would need to offer a 20% rebate to match the full value of Lilly's
multiple rebates across all of its drugs.1
2 9
The Lilly rebate is an example of defensive leveraging. Lilly faced a splin-
tered market and a new entrant with the potential to challenge the full range of
Lilly's monopoly. Lilly invented an ingenious program to use its power across
both the old and new markets to protect its core monopoly. Lilly was not trying
to expand monopoly profits by dominating the newly splintered submarket.
Rather, Lilly was using the power of multiple monopolies to prevent erosion of
its primary monopoly.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST LAW ARISING FROM DEFENSIVE
LEVERAGING THEORY
Contrary to the Chicago School analysis, defensive leveraging theory shows
123. See id. at 1060; SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1109 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
124. See SmithKline, 575 F.2d at 1059.
125. See SmithKline, 427 F. Supp. at 1102.
126. See id. at 1103.
127. See id. at 1105-06.
128. See id. at 1106.
129. See id. The District Court entered a permanent injunction against Lilly's marketing practices on
the grounds that Lilly had engaged in willful maintenance of monopoly power in violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act. See SmithKline, 427 F. Supp. at 1129. The District Court found that Lilly had illegally
linked its more powerful products to its unpatented products in order to maintain a monopoly in the full
cephalosporin market. See id. The Third Circuit affirmed. See SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575
F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978).
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that when a monopolist uses power in one market to create additional monopo-
lies in other markets, the behavior can damage competition. This is true because
a monopolist may leverage, not to reap additional monopoly profit from a
second market, but to prevent erosion of its primary monopoly. Such behavior
blocks the natural forces that would otherwise erode the primary monopoly and
restore competitive equilibrium. By impeding competitive forces and extending
the life of the primary monopoly, leveraging damages competition.
The following section discusses the implications of defensive leveraging
theory for antitrust law. The section first analyzes the current state of antitrust
law as it applies to leveraging. As described below, the law in this area is in
disarray; it is internally inconsistent as well as inconsistent with other areas of
antitrust law. Worse yet, it is inconsistent with all theories of leverage, including
traditional leverage theory, Chicago school doctrine, and post-Chicago analysis.
Thus, current antitrust law regarding leverage follows neither established judi-
cial doctrine nor any line of theoretical analysis.
In contrast, the following section uses defensive leveraging theory to con-
struct a four-part test that is consistent with the underlying doctrine. The test
could be applied to all cases involving defensive leveraging, regardless of
whether the case is brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act,1 30 § 2 of the Sherman
Act, 13 or § 3 of the Clayton Act.132 Thus, the test would unify the standards
used to evaluate defensive leverage claims and create a framework for a rational
and coherent approach to leverage law.
A. CURRENT ANTITRUST LAW
Leverage analysis arises most frequently in tying cases. As described above,
tying is an arrangement by a party to sell one product only on condition that the
buyer purchase another product, or at least agree not to purchase the second
product from any other suppliers. 133 Tying behavior is analyzed most frequently
under § 1 of the Sherman Act and occasionally under § 3 of the Clayton Act.
134
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... or
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994).
133. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
134. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 et al. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (applying
Sherman Act § 1); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (applying
Sherman Act § 1); Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (applying Sherman
Act § 1); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (applying Sherman Act § 1); United
States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (applying Sherman Act § 1); Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S.
1 (applying Sherman Act § 1); Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953)
(applying Sherman Act § 1); Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (applying Clayton Act
§ 3); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (applying Sherman Act § I and
Clayton Act § 3).
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conspiracy, in restraint of trade." 135 Almost every agreement relating to trade,
however, restrains trade to some extent. 136 Thus, taken literally, the words of the
Sherman Act could outlaw all business agreements and the entire body of
contract law. 13 7 To avoid this draconian result, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted § 1 of the Sherman Act to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of
trade. 138 Courts must then apply a "rule of reason" analysis to determine if a
particular practice is an unreasonable restraint of trade. 1
39
The classic description of the rule of reason test appears in Justice Brandeis's
opinion in Board of Trade v. United States: 1
40
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its conditions before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation
or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret
facts and to predict consequences.'1
4
The rule of reason is the common standard to judge restraints of trade under the
Sherman Act. 14 2 It requires a detailed and laborious inquiry which is described
by courts and commentators as complex and burdensome on litigants and the
judicial system.143 In order to avoid this burdensome inquiry, courts have
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
136. See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) [hereinafter Chicago Bd. of
Trade].
137. See National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
138. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (describing the
traditional judicial gloss on the language of Sherman Act § 1).
139. See, e.g., id. at 49.
140. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
141. Id. at 238; see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1910) (offering an early,
classic formulation of the rule of reason test).
142. See Pitofsky, supra note 48, at 830 (noting that the rule of reason is the common standard); see
also GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 49 (noting that the rule of reason is the prevailing standard of
analysis). The system can be summarized in the following manner: (1) The plaintiff has the initial
burden of showing that the behavior restrains competition in a specific market. The plaintiff must
delineate the relevant product and geographic markets. (2) If the plaintiff meets the initial burden, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that its behavior serves legitimate objectives. (3) If the defendant
meets that burden, the plaintiff has an opportunity to show that the defendant could meet its objective
using a less restrictive alternative. If the plaintiff makes that showing, the plaintiff wins. (4) If the
matter is still unresolved, the court must weigh the harms and benefits of the restraint. The plaintiff has
the burden at that stage to show that the restraint is unreasonable on balance. See 7 PHILIP E. AREEDA,
ANTTRtUST LAW 1502, at 371-72 (1986).
143. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 50 (describing rule of reason trials as complex and
burdensome on litigants and the judicial system); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
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developed a streamlined rule to handle certain types of trade conduct. Courts
consider some conduct so anticompetitive in nature and effect that it is unneces-
sary to engage in an elaborate study of the behavior under the particular
circumstances in the case.' 44 These types of behavior are deemed to violate the
antitrust laws "per se." As the Supreme Court noted in Jefferson Parish: "[t]he
rationale for per se rules in part is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual
market conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct
is so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining whether the
particular case at bar involves anticompetitive conduct." 1
45
Per se rules are reserved for conduct that is pernicious and without redeem-
ing value in all, or nearly all, manifestations. 46 Courts are reluctant to apply
per se analysis to a behavior unless there is sufficient judicial experience to
show that the conduct is almost always anticompetitive.
147
The per se rule applies to tying allegations raised under § 1 of the Sherman
Act. As the Supreme Court noted in Jefferson Parish, "it is far too late in the
history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain
tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and there-
fore are unreasonable 'per se.' "48
2. Section 3 of the Clayton Act
Courts also analyze tying behavior under § 3 of the Clayton Act. Section 3 of
the Clayton Act affects transactions in which the purchaser agrees not to use
goods from the seller's competitor. Sellers may not engage in such transactions
(1958) (noting that the rule of reason analysis requires an incredibly complicated and prolonged
economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries); see
also Pitofsky, supra note 48, at 830 & n.42 (citing United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927), in which the Court refused to apply the rule of reason because of the practical difficulties of the
minute inquiry into economic organization required); cf Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 34 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (comparing rule of reason to the peculiar form of per
se rule applied in tying cases and describing both as requiring extensive and time-consuming economic
analysis).
144. See National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985).
145. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-16 n.25.
146. As described in Northern Pacific Railway Co., "there are certain agreements or practices which
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use." 356 U.S. at 5.
147. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp, 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) ("[w]e have been slow ... to extend per se analysis to restraints
imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact ... is not immediately
obvious"); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (noting that per se rule
will be applied once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the court to predict with
confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it); see also GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 50 n.16
(finding that although cases that do not fit may arise, per se rule reflects judgment that such cases are
not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense to identify them).
148. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9.
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when the effect of the agreement may be to substantially lessen competition. 1
49
The House Report on § 3 of the Clayton Act specifically condemns tying
agreements, calling them "one of the greatest agencies and instrumentalities of
monopoly ever devised by the brain of man." '
50
The language used in § 3 of the Clayton Act differs from the language of § 1
of the Sherman Act. While § 1 of the Sherman Act has been interpreted to
forbid agreements that unreasonably restrain trade, § 3 of the Clayton Act
forbids agreements not to purchase a competitor's goods if the effect is to
substantially lessen competition. Despite the differing verbal formulations,
courts generally apply the same standard of proof to tying cases regardless of
whether a plaintiff claims a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act or § 3 of the
Clayton Act. 51  Thus, tying claims brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act or § 3
of the Clayton Act are analyzed under the per se rule using a single standard of
proof.
152
3. The Per Se Rule in Tying Cases Compared to Classic Per Se Analysis
The per se rule for tying claims is quite different from the per se rule applied
to other types of behavior. The classic per se rule condemns a practice without
proof of market power, effect on competition, or anticompetitive intent. 53 In
contrast, to satisfy the per se rule in tying cases, a plaintiff must show that the
seller has "appreciable economic power" .in the tying product market and that
the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market.'
54
149. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to
lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods ... on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a
competitor of competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially
lessen competition ....
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994).
150. H.R. REP. No. 63-627, pt. 1, at 13 (1914); see also 9 AREEDA, supra note 7, 1700d, at 6
(noting that the House Report forcefully expressed fear of the power to leverage into a second market).
The Supreme Court has further linked § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act by relying
on the legislative history of the Clayton Act to justify applying the per se standard to tying cases
brought under the Sherman Act. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 10-11.
151. See 9 AREEDA, supra note 7, 1719b, at 254, 257 (citing Federal Courts of Appeals cases);
DAVID C. HJELMFELT, ANTITRUST AND REGULATED INDUsTRIES 51 (1985).
152. There are differences in the types of cases covered by the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.
Although the Sherman Act applies to both goods and services, the Clayton Act applies only to goods
and only to transactions within the flow of commerce. See 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVEN-
KAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 303c (1995); HJELMFELT, supra note 151, at 51.
153. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 33 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the usual logic of a
per se rule condemns a restraint without proof of market power or anticompetitive effect); 9 AREEDA,
supra note 7, 1720a, at 258; Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 384 (1966) (noting that a true per se rule disregards
questions of market power and intent).
154. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
210919991
HeinOnline -- 87 Geo. L.J. 2109 1998-1999
TRE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
In other words, courts require proof that the defendant has market power 55 and
at least some proof that the behavior could have an anticompetitive effect.'
56
The classic per se rule also condemns a practice without weighing possible
justifications. 5 7 In contrast, courts generally allow defenses when applying the
per se rule in tying cases.' 58 In short, the per se rule for tying requires a far
greater variety and quantity of proof than the per se rule applied in most other
antitrust contexts.' 59 In light of this problem, four Supreme Court Justices in
Jefferson Parish recommended abandoning per se analysis in tying cases to
bring the law of tie-ins into accord with other areas of antitrust law. 1
60
Not only is the per se rule for tying inconsistent with other per se rules, it is
also internally inconsistent. The goal of a per se rule is to streamline the case
and avoid an extensive judicial inquiry into economic details. In contrast, the
per se rule for tying requires and even invites courts to enter into some degree
of economic analysis. Courts must try to steer a course between these conflict-
ing dictates, a difficult, if not impossible, mandate. '
6'
Despite the concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court
continues to examine tying claims under the old, idiosyncratic per se rule.'
6 2
Thus, the per se rule in tying cases remains internally inconsistent and inconsis-
tent with the per se analysis applied to other types of behavior.
The per se standard applied in tying cases also is inconsistent with all
theories of leverage. It follows neither traditional leverage theory, Chicago
school doctrine, nor post-Chicago analysis. Traditional leverage theory, as
expressed by some early Supreme Court cases and by Congress, concludes that
"[t]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
155. Courts will infer power if the firm has a predominant market share in the tying product market.
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,464 (1992).
156. See 9 AREEDA, supra note 7, 1720a, at 258.
157. See id.
158. See 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 13, 1760-5, at 353-415 (describing defenses that the court
will entertain in a per se tying case).
159. Professor Salop summarizes the state of tying law in the following manner.
[T]he current per se rule against tying is quite different than the per se rule against
price-fixing, in that it requires a showing of market power. Kodak recognized that the proper
analysis of market definition and market power really amounted to an inquiry into potential
anticompetitive effect. That is not market definition in a vacuum and it surely is not the per se
rule of International Salt.
Salop Interview, supra note 41, at 22.
160. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. See id. at 34-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("the per se label in the tying context has generated
more confusion than coherent law because it appears to invite lower courts to omit the analysis of
economic circumstances of the tie that has always been a necessary element of tying analysis"); cf
BoRK, supra note 30, at 377 ("[m]uch of the Sherman Act's doctrinal chaos is attributable to judicial
and scholarly fondness for impossibly broad statements of the per se rule").
162. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992) (applying
the idiosyncratic per se analysis in a post-Jefferson Parish tying case).
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competition." 163 If tying behavior truly is pernicious and without redeeming
value in nearly all cases, the Court should apply the classic per se analysis.
Once the plaintiff establishes the requisite tying behavior, the behavior should
be condemned without requiring elaborate proof of market power or anticompeti-
tive effects and without considering justifications. As described above, however,
the per se rule in tying is quite different. Thus, the rule strays far from the
standard suggested by traditional leverage theory.
The current per se rule for tying cases also is inconsistent with Chicago
school theories. If the Chicago school is correct, tying cannot damage competi-
tion because a second monopoly obtained through tying generates no more
monopoly profit than the original monopoly alone. Thus, in most cases, tying is
not anticompetitive; it must be either pro-competitive or neutral. If tying is not
predominantly anticompetitive, a tying claim should not be governed by any
version of the per se rule. It should be subject to a rule of reason analysis, which
would be sufficient to cover those few cases in which a firm imposes a tie that
results in anticompetitive effects. 164 In fact, some scholars have suggested that
the per se prohibition against tying should be eliminated in light of the Chicago
school analysis. 165 Nevertheless, the per se rule for tying persists. 1
66
Finally, the per se rule in tying cases is inconsistent with post-Chicago
theories. As described above, 167 post-Chicago theories have shown that in a few,
carefully defined circumstances, firms can attain additional monopoly profit
through leverage. Post-Chicago theories require detailed, fact-specific inquiries,
an approach which does not fit easily with per se analysis. Thus, post-Chicago
theories imply that tying cases should be handled under the intense scrutiny of
the rule of reason, not under any per se formulation. The rule applied in tying
163. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); see also H.R. REP. No. 63-627,
pt. 1, at 13 (1914) (condemning tying contracts).
164. POSNER, supra note 30, at 182.
165. See id. ("[t]he prohibition against tie-ins ought to be radically curtailed and in the absence of a
general prohibition of systematic price discrimination eliminated"); Pitofsky, supra note 48, at 830
(predicting in 1987 that the per se rule in tie-in cases would soon disappear in light of Chicago-style
economic analysis); cf HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 285 (citing statements from Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) and Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447
(1993) that, when read together, give reason for doubting the continued viability of the leverage
theory).
Professor Areeda argued that tying should largely, although not entirely, disappear as a separate
subject. He suggested that the focus should be on the severity of market foreclosure caused by a certain
behavior, whether or not the foreclosure was brought about by power over a different product. See 9
AREEDA, supra note 7, 1701d, at 29.
166. Although Chicago school theories have failed to substantially alter judicial tying doctrine, they
have affected executive branch behavior. During the 1980s, the height of the Chicago school's
prominence, antitrust enforcement efforts declined in response to Chicago school doctrines. See
Pitofsky, supra note 48, at 821 (noting, in 1987, a decline in antitrust enforcement in part because of the
Chicago school's conclusion that a firm cannot export power from one market to another through
leverage).
167. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text (describing post-Chicago theories).
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cases, therefore, is inconsistent with post-Chicago theories as well as other
leverage theories.
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEFENSIVE LEVERAGING THEORY FOR TYING DOCTRINE
Whatever leverage theory one applies, it is clear that the current treatment of
tying cases is inadequate. The current standard of proof applied in tying cases is
internally inconsistent and inconsistent with other areas of antitrust law. In
addition, tying law is inconsistent with all leverage theories. Defensive leverag-
ing theory, however, can be used to construct a rational and coherent approach
to tying law, at least for claims involving defensive leveraging.
Defensive leveraging theory shows that leverage behavior such as tying can
be dangerous to competition in a variety of circumstances. In order to justify
continued application of the per se rule, however, one would have to conclude
that the vast majority of leverage cases are dangerous to competition.1 68 Thus,
one would have to show that most leveraging is either (1) defensive leveraging,
which blocks competitive forces in the primary market; or (2) the type of
leveraging identified occasionally by post-Chicago scholars that damages compe-
tition through additional monopoly profit from the secondary market. This
would require an empirical analysis that is beyond the scope of this piece and
beyond the current state of leverage theory. Thus, the current experience with
leveraging cases is insufficient to justify continued use of a per se analysis.' 69
Without per se analysis, courts would apply the rule of reason to examine
tying cases brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act.
The current rule of reason, however, is as unsatisfactory for tying cases as per
se analysis. Under a rule of reason analysis, the court looks at the harm that the
practice causes to competition, any justifications for the behavior and any
pro-competitive effects. 170 In practice, the rule of reason analysis is long and
cumbersome, requiring detailed and complex economic analysis that is a burden-
some to litigants and the judicial system.' 71 Common wisdom holds that a
lawsuit will fail unless the plaintiff can avoid rule of reason analysis and obtain
per se treatment.172 Thus, the rule of reason is an inadequate response to
behavior that frequently poses a significant threat to competition.
168. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that courts are reluctant to apply per se
analysis without sufficient judicial experience to determine whether conduct is almost always anticom-
petitive).
170. 7 AREEDA, supra note 142, 1502, at 372; see also Chicago Bd. of Trade, supra note 136, at
238 (providing an early, essential formulation of the standard).
171. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
172. The Supreme Court also has expressed frustration that the rule of reason analysis, in addition to
being lengthy and cumbersome, may be an exercise in futility. Courts may be ill-equipped to make the
type of economic inquiry required by the rule of reason. The Court noted in United States v. Topco
Assocs.: "[I]nability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the
economy against promotion of competition in another sector is one important reason we have
formulated per se rules." 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972); see also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting that the rule of reason inquiry is often wholly fruitless when undertaken).
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A more rational approach would be a structured rule of reason analysis. This
test should give plaintiffs a manageable burden to meet and a reasonable
opportunity to prevail in legitimate cases while allowing sufficient opportunity
for defendants to prove that the primary effect of the behavior is pro-
competitive. Such an analysis would preserve the goal of determining whether a
restraint of trade is unreasonable without inviting the wide-ranging and complex
inquiry of current rule of reason cases. For defensive leveraging cases that
involve tying, plaintiffs should be required to make the following four-part
showing: (1) the defendant has market power in the tying product; (2) the
defendant has engaged in tying;1 73 (3) the behavior eliminates rivals in the
second market; and (4) the elimination of rivals protects the original monopoly.
Plaintiffs could satisfy the fourth part of the test by showing either that the
second market presents a direct threat to the primary monopoly or that the
second market is a way station likely to significantly ease entry into the primary
market. Those defendants who wish to argue that their behavior is pro-
competitive could present evidence at step four that the primary effect of
eliminating rivals in the second market is procompetitive rather than protective
of the original monopoly. The structured rule of reason outlined above would
reach the core of allegations under a defensive leveraging claim: The defendant
has leveraged its power from one market into another market to protect the
original market from the natural forces of competition.
1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Monopoly Maintenance Claims
Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids the act of monopolizing or attempting
to monopolize trade or commerce. 174 In describing the act of monopolization,
the Supreme Court has said the following: "The offense of monopoly ... has
two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident." 1
75
Thus, § 2 of the Sherman Act forbids the act of monopolization which is the
willful acquisition or maintenance of a monopoly. 176 Plaintiffs have brought
leveraging claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act, usually by claiming that a firm
is using its market power in the tying market to attempt to monopolize the tied
market. 177
173. Current requirements for determining whether two products exist and whether there is a tie
between them would remain under the structured rule of reason.
174. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1998).
175. United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
176. Monopoly power under § 2 requires something greater than market power under § 1. See
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,481 (1992).
177. See Kaplow, supra note 14, at 515, 517; see, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters.,
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2. Defensive Leveraging as Monopoly Maintenance
The heart of defensive leveraging behavior is an attempt to protect the
original monopoly from the forces of competition. In defensive leveraging, the
natural forces of competition threaten to erode the monopolist's power in the
primary market. The monopolist responds by leveraging into a new market in
order to protect its original monopoly. This behavior fits the definition of
monopoly maintenance: willful action to ward off competitive forces and
preserve monopoly power.
Given the current confused state of Sherman Act § 1 doctrine, one could
advocate analyzing all defensive leveraging cases, including those involving
tying, under § 2 of the Sherman Act. This would avoid all of the inconsistencies
of tying law while reaching the essence of defensive leveraging behavior and its
threat to competition. Directing all tying cases that involve defensive leveraging
to § 2 of the Sherman Act, however, would ignore extensive judicial doctrine
applying § 1 of the Sherman Act to tying. For more than half a century, courts
have analyzed tying cases under § 1 of the Sherman Act as well as under § 2.
Worse yet, it would ignore the legislative history of § 3 of the Clayton Act
which specifically condemns tying arrangements and which the Court has
linked to Sherman Act § 1 analysis.1 78 Thus, suggesting that defensive leverag-
ing claims should arise only under § 2 of the Sherman Act would ignore
substantial judicial and legislative precedent. 1
79
As a more appealing solution, one could continue to allow tying claims under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act as well as § 2 of the Sherman
Act. The goal, however, would be to harmonize and more precisely focus the
proof required under each. Thus, the same essential analysis should apply in
Sherman Act § 2 monopoly maintenance claims based on defensive leveraging
as in claims brought under Sherman Act § 1 and Clayton Act § 3. As described
above, the offense of monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act involves the
possession of monopoly power and the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power.1 80 In testing for willful maintenance of monopoly power through
leverage, courts should apply the same four-part test described above. Although
Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 612 n.1 (1977) (alleging violation of Sherman Act § 2 as well as § 1); Times-
Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (same).
178. Cf Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating that Congress has been aware for some time that the Court applies per se analysis to tying
claims under Sherman Act § 1).
179. Section 2 monopolization claims also require a much stronger showing of power in the primary
market than the showing required under the current § 1 tying doctrine. First, § 2 requires a showing of
monopoly power, a more difficult standard to meet than the market power requirement of § 1. See
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481. In addition, tying cases under § 1 currently are analyzed under the per
se rule. The per se rule requires an even lower level of proof of market power than the ordinary
requirement under § 1. Thus, moving from the lowered market power requirement under the per se test
of § 1 to the heightened monopoly power requirement of § 2 would be a drastic change from current
law.
180. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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some differences will arise,' 8 ' the essential inquiry should remain the same. The
four-part test also could be applied in the context of defensive leveraging claims
brought under any other type of antitrust claim. '
82
The four-part test would make antitrust law concerning defensive leveraging
consistent with other areas of antitrust law and consistent with the underlying
economic theory. In addition, creating a unified test ensures that each case will
turn on the nature of the behavior and the magnitude of the threat rather than on
verbal formulations or the ability to squeeze facts into a particular pigeon hole.
The unified approach echoes other limited attempts in antitrust law to harmo-
nize standards when a single harm and a single behavior are at issue despite
differing verbal formulations. 183 It may serve as a model for continued harmoni-
zation of broader areas of antitrust law.
CONCLUSION
The debate over leverage has focused on whether a monopolist can use
leverage to gain additional monopoly profit from a second market. Traditional
leverage theorists and the Chicago school have reached opposite conclusions.
Both fail, however, to analyze the effect of leverage on the structure of the
primary market. Thus, neither theory draws a complete picture of leveraging's
potential harm to competition, and neither theory asks the right question.
Defensive leveraging theory completes the picture by showing that when a
monopolist leverages into a new market, it may be an attempt to prevent erosion
of the primary monopoly. In the natural lifecycle of a monopoly, new entrants
are likely to erode a monopolist's power by splitting off segments of the market
or developing next-generation substitutes. New entrants are likely to take these
paths in order to lower the cost of entry, avoid customer loyalty, break network
effects, and skirt legal barriers. The monopolist can block this entry by leverag-
ing the power from its core stronghold into the newly created market. The
monopolist thereby wards off competitive market forces and prevents the
erosion of its original monopoly. Such behavior damages competition by block-
ing the market forces that, over time, would extinguish the monopoly.
Defensive leveraging theory confirms judicial and legislative instincts about
the effects of leveraging behavior. When a monopolist uses its power in one
market to expand into other markets and create additional monopolies, the
behavior may damage competition.
181. For example, the test for monopoly power under § 2 differs from the test for market power
under § 1. See supra note 176.
182. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing other types of claims involving leverage
theories).
183. See 9 AREEDA, supra note 7, 1719b, at 254-57 (citing Federal Courts of Appeals cases to
show that courts generally apply a single standard for tying violations under Sherman Act § 1 and
Clayton Act § 3 despite the fact that the words of the two Acts differ); see also HJELMFELT, supra note
151, at 51.
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